Comparative Civilizations Review
Volume 10
Number 10 Civilizations East and West: A
Memorial Volume for Benjamin Nelson

Article 11

1-1-1985

The Duty to Desire: Love, Friendship, and Sexuality in Some
Puritan Theories of Marriage
Edmund Leites

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr

Recommended Citation
Leites, Edmund (1985) "The Duty to Desire: Love, Friendship, and Sexuality in Some Puritan Theories of
Marriage," Comparative Civilizations Review: Vol. 10 : No. 10 , Article 11.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol10/iss10/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Comparative Civilizations Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For
more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Leites: The Duty to Desire: Love, Friendship, and Sexuality in Some Purit

9. The Duty to Desire: Love,
Friendship, and Sexuality in Some
Puritan Theories of Marriage
Edmund Leites

When philosophers or political scientists look for early statements of
some modern Western ideas of marriage, they are likely to turn to Locke's
Two Treatises of Government, for there we find elements or hints of the
modern view that marriage is a contractual relation between two
autonomous and equal partners. Husband and wife jointly set the terms
of their relationship; their particular interests determine its character;
they retain the freedom to leave when the terms of the contract are no
longer satisfied. In this search of forerunners, however, it is a mistake to
limit one's reading of seventeenth-century texts to Locke's. In the
following pages, I hope to persuade you that a number of seventeenthcentury English theologians and preachers, for the most part Puritan,
deserve equal attention. I shall consider William Ames and Richard
Baxter, two of the most important casuists for seventeenth-century
Puritans; Thomas Gataker, William Gouge, and Daniel Rogers, three
Puritan clergymen who distinguished themselves particularly in their
writings on marriage; and Jeremy Taylor, who was no Puritan, but whose
attitudes toward marriage were in many respects like those of the Puritan
casuists and theologians.
By calling someone "Puritan," I mean to say that he or she was part of
the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century popular movement to reform
English Christianity. In spite of the many divisions within this movement,
there are general features which characterize all the intellectual and
social tendencies I call "Puritan." Puritans demanded that they and others
lead a life which was, in the realm of everyday conduct, ethically strict; in
the realm of belief, meticulously scrupulous; in matters of ritual, simple
(thus they were suspicious of cross and mitre, surplice and relic); and in
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matters of piety, deeply concerned with the inward state of the soul (thus
they were hostile to a church satisfied with the perfunctory performance
of outward acts}.1 This piety, as we shall see, has its analogue in the
Puritans' notion of conjugal love: an outward fulfillment of the duties of
marriage was not enough; the proper intentions and feelings toward your
spouse must also exist.
A few reflections on the Roman Catholic background of Puritan ideas
are in order. Let us begin with the Roman Catechism of 1566, "a careful
distillation of Counter-reformation theology," in which we find a
statement of the ends of marriage as established by God; we should seek at
least one of them in marrying, although we may have other ends as well. It
tells us that the first of the appropriate ends is the
... very partnership of diverse sexes-sought by natural instinct,
and compacted in the hope of mutual help so that one aided by the
other may more easily bear the discomforts of life and sustain the
weakness of old age. Another is the appetite of procreation, not so
much that heirs of property and riches be left, but that worshippers
of the true faith and religion be educated ... And this is the one
cause why God instituted marriage at the beginning.... The third is
one which after the fall of the first parent was added to the other
causes, ... [for man's] appetite began to fight with right reason; so
indeed he who is conscious of his weakness and does not wish to
bear the battle of the flesh may use the remedy to avoid the sins of
lust. 2
In making companionship, specifically, mutual support and comfort,
one of the chief purposes of marriage, indeed, in listing companionship
first among these purposes, the authors of the catechism went against
those within the Catholic world, such as Augustine, who made little of
this side of marriage. Genesis (2. 18-23) tells us that God did not find it
good for man to be alone; therefore, he gave Adam a helpmeet: woman,
bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh; she pleased him greatly. But why, asks
Augustine (De Genesi ad Litteram Libri Duodecim, 9. 7) did Adam need a
woman to be his helpmeet? As far as he can see, he replies, she would have
been of no use to him, or any man, if she had not been capable of bearing
children: "Non itaque video, ad quod aliud adiutorium mulier facta sit
vira, si generandi causa substrahitur." What, then, of woman as delightful
companion to man, comforter, supporter? What of man as this to woman?
This receives scant mention in the theology of Augustine, who was, in
matters of marriage, sexuality, and the status of woman, often more
liberal than other Fathers of the Church. In his commentary on Genesis
(9. 7), he repeats what he had said some years before in De Bono Coniugale:
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the goods of marriage are three, fides, proles, sacramentum. Fides, "fidelity,"
includes paying the marriage debt as well as keeping from intercourse
with others; proles, the good of offspring, includes the support and
education of children as well as their creation; marriage is a sacramentum,
a "symbol of stability," therefore indissoluble. None of these goods, as
Noonan convincingly argues, includes the delight in the companionship
and comfort which a man and a woman can give to each other. 3
Within the medieval and early modern Roman Church, Aristotle's
Nichomachean Ethics sustained those who sought to give a more honored
place to marriage as friendship. In the Ethics, Aristotle says that marriage
is a kind of friendship, indeed, one more natural to human beings than
the friendship of those who constitute the polis (Nichomachean Ethics
1162a15-20). True, we are by nature political animals (Politics 1253a5-10),
but we are even more inclined to form couples than we are to form cities.
We are, as it is put in the Latin Aristotle upon which Thomas commented,
"in natura coniugale magis quam politicam" (Thomas Aquinas, Sententia
Libri Ethicorum 8. 12).
Aristotle sees three grounds for friendship: friends can be useful to
each other, they can delight in one another's company (for a variety of
reasons), and they can love one another's virtue. All three are available to
the married couple. Spouses can be useful to each other in the running of
a household, they can please and delight each other in their sexual
relations, and they can love one another's virtue, if they are virtuous
(Nichomachean Ethics 1162a25-30). Marriage love is special, for it can
unite into one all the kinds of friendship we can ever have: virtuous men
can love each other for their virtue; youths typically love each other for
sheer pleasure; old men may well be friends because it is useful to them,
since people "at that age pursue not the pleasant but the useful"
(Nichomachean Ethics 1156 a 5-1156 b 1 0). Spouses, however, may love one
another for all these reasons, at any stage of life.
The idea of marriage as friendship is taken up by Thomas. 4 Indeed, he
relies upon Aristotle's notion that there must be a certain equality in all
relationships to defend his belief that a man can have only one wife at a
time. If reason deems it improper for a woman to have several husbands
at one time, as it does, then, Thomas argues, it is wrong for a man to have
several wives at one time, for marriage is a friendship, and "equality is a
condition of friendship." "Were it lawful for a man to have several wives,"
but not lawful for a wife to have several husbands, "the friendship of a
wife for her husband would not be freely bestowed, but servile as it
were," for she would not be his true equal. "And this argument," says
Thomas, "is confirmed by experience: since where men have several
wives, the wives are treated as servants" (Summa Contra Gentiles 3. 124).
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"The greatest friendship" seems to be between spouses, Thomas writes,
for husband and wife "are made one not only in the act of carnal
intercourse, which even among dumb animals causes an agreeable
fellowship, but also as partners in the whole intercourse of daily life: so
that, to indicate this, man must leave father and mother (Gen. 2. 24) for
his wife's sake" (Summa Contra Gentiles 3. 123).
The approach of Aristotle and Thomas to marriage lives on in the
sixteenth-century Roman catechism from which I quoted earlier. The
same belief that marriage is a friendship, and a source of mutual delight
and comfort, sustains some of the liberalizing tendencies within the late
medieval and early modern church concerning sexual delight within
marriage. Augustine took the position that God warrants and permits the
pleasure and delight of intercourse among spouses only to the extent that
it furthers the end of procreation: "What food is for the health of man,
intercourse is for the health of the species, and each is not without carnal
delight which cannot be lust, if modified and restrained by tem perance, it
is brought to a natural use," that is, done for the sake of procreation (De
Bono Coniugale 16. 18). Unlike Aristotle, he did not think of sexual delight
as a constituent of marriage friendship. Aristotle's belief remained alive
in spite of Augustine. It was fully presented by Thomas in his commentary
on the philosopher's Ethics; moreover, Thomas accepts Aristotle's
outlook, although he does not make much of it, in the Summa Contra
Gentiles (3. 123). The Scotsman John Major, professor of theology at the
Universities of Paris, Glasgow, and St. Andrews during the first half of the
sixteenth century, does much more with it. In his commentary on the
sentences of Peter Lombard, he writes that "whatever men say, it is
difficult to prove that a man sins in knowing his own wife for the sake of
having pleasure," for husband and wife marry not only to have children,
but to provide "consolation" to one another. 5 Others argued for the
opinion permitting intercourse between spouses for pleasure on different
grounds; the defense of this opinion in the seventeenth century
provoked fierce opposition from rigorists within the Church, especially
the theologians of Louvain, led by the Irishman John Sinnigh, who called
the opinion permitting intercourse for pleasure "brutish."6
John Major did not go so far as to make the life of the married equal or
superior in merit to the life of committed celibates. But the doctrine that
celibacy is the superior state, vigorously defended by writers like Jerome
and Chrysostom in the ancient world,7 and upheld by Thomas (close as
he was to Aristotle), was not to go unchallenged in the sixteenth century.
What could be more honorable or holy than matrimony, Erasmus asks in
his Encomium Matrimonii;8 since its author was not Lycurgus, Moses, or
Solon, but God himself:
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For at the begynnyng when he had made man of the slyme of the
erthe he thought that his lyfe shoulde be utterly myserable and
unpleasaunt, if he joyned not Eve a compagnion unto him ... Now
syr if the other sacramentes of Christes chyrch be had in great
veneration, who seeth nat that moch worshyppe ought to be gyven
to this, which was both ordeyned of god, & fyrst of all other? And
the other in erth, this in paradise/the other for remedy/this for
solas/the other were put to in helpe of nature ... which was fallen,
only this was gyven to nature at the fyrst creation. 9
"Bachelershyp," Erasmus tells a friend who is unwilling to marry, is "a
forme of lyvnge bothe barren and unnaturall," whereas nothing could be
more natural than wedlock, so much so that all peoples, no matter how
barbarous, deem it holy. 10 God has deeply imprinted the need and desire
for marriage love not only upon us, but upon other species, for "the sense
and feelynge" of marriage love "hath not only perced the turtyls/and the
doves/but also the most cruell wyld bestes. For the lyons be gentil and
meeke to theyr lyonnesses" (sig. B5 v). Whosoever, therefore, "is not
touched with desyr of wed locke seemeth no man, but a stone/an ennemy
to nature/a rebelle to God/by his owne foly sekynge hys decay and
undoynge" (sig. B4v-[B5']).
Christ said that those who gelded themselves for the kingdom of God
were blessed (Matt. 19), but the Lord's word appertained to those times
"when it was expedient to be most redy & lose from all worldy
bussynesses." Today, surely, Erasmus says, "the most holy kynd of lyfe is
wedlocke puerly & chastly kept" (sig. CiV). And in this bond, duty and
pleasure need not be enemies:
... if the most parte of thynges (yea whyche be also bytter) ar of a
good man to be desyred for none other purpose, but bycause they
be honeste, matrimony doutles is chefely to be desyred whereof a
man may dout whether it hath more honesty than plesure [.J For
what thynge is sweeter, then with her to lyve, with whome ye may
be most streghtly copuled, not onely in the benevolence of the
mynd, but also in the coniunction of the body (sig. [C6']).
The "plesure of bodyes is the leste parte of the goodes that wedlock
hathe" (sig. [Csv]), yet it is not to be despised. It has
... bene rightly every where pronounced as a proverbe, that god nor
nature have made no thynge frustrate nor in vayne/why (I pray you)
hath god geven us these members? why these pryckes and
provocations? why hath he added the power of begettynge, if
bachelarshyp be taken for a prayse? (sig. [B7v]).
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The member is meant to be used. "If one wold gyve you a pretious gyfte,
as a bowel a garment/ or a swerde, ye shuld seme unworthy [of] the thyng
that ye have receyved, if outher ye wolde nat, or ye could nat use it" (sig.
[B7v]). He who is not taken with the pleasures of earthly love-so sweetly
coupled with fond devotion within marriage-"certes," says Erasmus
(sig. [C8 v]). "I would cal hym no man but a playne stone." Nothing can be
said for the man content with bachelorhood. "What is more hateful! then
the man which (as though he were borne only to hymselfe) Iyveth for
hymselfe, seketh for hymselfe/spareth for hymselfe/doth cost to hymselfe,
loveth no persone, is loved of no persone?" (sig. [C8']).
Erasmus was not alone in his advocacy of the superiority of the married
state over virginity; Wives took the same position, and Todd II argues that
a substantial number of sixteenth-century Catholics and Anglicans did
the same. Yet the fate of the ideas of Erasmus and his like was not
altogether a happy one. On the continent, the Council of Trent declared
the view that marriage is superior to celibacy "anathema."12 In 1547, the
Sorbonne put the Encomium Matrimonii on the index of prohibited
books. 13 In the "large" catechism of Cardinal Bel!armine, the Dichiarazione
piu copiosa della dottrina cristiana (1598), of great influence in the
seventeenth-century Church, the "Student" asks, "Whether it is better to
take the Sacrament of Matrimonie or to kepe virginitie?" The "Master"
replies,
The Apostel S. Paul hath cleared this doubt, having written that he
who joyneth himself in Mariage doth weI, but he that doth not joyne
himself, but kepeth virginite doth better. And the reason is, because
Mariage is a thing humane, Virginitie is Angelical. Mariage is
according to nature, Virginitie is above nature. And not only
virginitie but widowhood is also better than mariage. Therefore
whereas our Saviour said in a parable, that the good sede yelded in
one fild thirtie fold fmite, in an other threescore, in an other a
hundred fold: the holie Doctors have declared, that the thirtie fold
fmite is of Matrimonie, the threescore fold of widowhood, the
hundreth fold of virginitie. 14
In England, whose humanists had perhaps taught Erasmus something
about marriage,15 the union of erotic, spiritual, domestic, and ethical
bonds in one marriage ideal, the notion of marriage as the best sort of
friendship, and the idea that it is the best sort of life for man and woman,
fared rather better a success which no doubt owed something to the
Church of England's rejection of institutionalized celibacy, in both
monastic orders and the life of the secular priest. From the second half of
the sixteenth century, students at Oxford and Cambridge "encountered a
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university curriculum that included the words of ... Erasmus, Jean Luis
Vives and Thomas More." Preachers cited them, and the scholarly and
pious made their works part of their collections. 16 And from the 1620s to
the 1660s, a flood of often superbly written texts on marriage came forth,
largely from Puritan pens. "Let al Papists, Jesuites, Priests, or others,"
writes Rogers, 17 "with all their fomenters and adherents, tremble and be
ashamed, who have dared so many times dishonour marriage, and so
many wayes to defile it." "They know not the benefit of the married
estate," writes Gouge, "who prefer single life before it." He calls upon
"the admirerers and praisers of a single estate" to "bring forth all their
reasons, and put them in the other scole against marriage. If these two be
duly poised, and rightly weyed," he says, "we should find single life too
light to be compared with honest marriage."18
What is so good about married life? Gouge offering a trinity of reasons
alread y well-established within the Catholic and Angelican world, says it
is for procreation, the avoidance of fornication, and mutual aid: "No such
helpe," writes Gouge, "can man have from any other creature as from a
wife; or a woman, as from an husband."19
Like Erasmus, Puritans argue for the excellence of marriage by
pointing out that it was instituted by God before humankind had fallen; it
was not simply a remedy for our concupiscence (though that it became,
once we fell). It was part of the paradisical state itself. But why did Adam
need a wife? Why did he need to better his condition in this way? What
was wrong with Paradise without Eve? The Puritans do not share the
outlook of Augustine, who thought that she would have been of no use to
Adam had she not been the bearer of his children. For the Puritans, she
was also his companion: it was not good that he was alone (Gen. 2.18), and
he needed a woman for a companion, as she needed a man. Seeker puts it
well:
When all other creatures had their mates,Adam wanted his: Though
he was the Emperor of the Earth, and the Admiral of the Seas, yet in
Paradise without a companion, though he was truly happy yet he
was not fully happy; Though he had enough for his board, yet he
had not enough for his bed; Though he had many creatures to
serve him, yet he wanted a creature to solace him; when he was
compounded in creation, he must be compleated by conjunction;
when he had no sinne to hurt him, then he must have a wife to help
him; It is not good that man should be alone. 20
Therefore, God determined to make him a helpmeet. But as Gouge
writes, none of the birds or beasts that God had already created would do,
so Adam's creator created woman out of "mans substance and side, and
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after his image." Her maker then presented Eve to Adam for his
consideration. The first man manifested "a good liking to her," so God
gave her to him "to bee his wife." Thus "the inviolable law of the neer and
firm union of man and wife" was first "enacted."21
It is true, before Adam had Eve, he had God, but this was not enough to
remove his loneliness; nor could it be assuaged by the creatures that
already "lived on the earth, or breathed the air." He needed a woman; and
once a woman was created, she needed a man.
The cure of Adam's loneliness was to be love: his love for Eve, and her
love for him; Eve's loneliness would be cured in the same way. Marriage
provides this balm. The Puritans say that men must love their wives, and
wives, their husbands; this is a duty that flows out of one of the purposes
for which marriage was first instituted: thus Gouge tells us that there
must be "mutuall love betwixt man and wife ... else the end and right use
of marriage will be perverted." Baxter tells us in firm tones that "the first
Duty of Husbands is to Love their Wives (and Wives their Husbands) with a true
intire Conjugal Love." "Conjugal Love" is a "mayne and joint duty of the
married," says Rogers. 22

The Puritans' appreciation of conjugal love was accompanied by an
acute awareness of how bad a bad marriage was; their sense of this was no
doubt sharpened by their appreciation of the pleasures and comfort of a
happily married life. Marriage, writes Gataker "is a business of the greatest
consequence, and that whereon the maine comfort or discomfort of a mans
life doth depend; that which may make thine house to bee as an heaven or
an hell here upon earth."23
"They that enter into the state of marriage," writes Jeremy Taylor, 24
who is in accord with the Puritans on this matter, "cast a dye of the
greatest contingency, and yet of the greatest interest in the world, next to
the last throw for eternity." A happy marriage provides a joy that lasts
throughout life, an unhappy one creates lasting sorrow for both spouses.
A wife "hath no sanctuary to retire to, from an evill husband; she must
remain at home, the very source of her unhappiness, to "dwell upon her
sorrow." A husband can run "from many hours of his sadness, yet he
must return to it again, and when he sits among his neighbours he
remembers the objection that lies in his bosome, and he sighs deeply."
Puritan authors sometimes referred to the words of Augustine, who, on
more than one occasion, said that a bad marriage is like a bad conscience:
you cannot get away from it. When love is absent between husband and
wife, writes Baxter, it is like "a Bone out of joynt; there is no ease, no order"
between them, till they are set right again.25
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The love required in marriage is more than a general good will or
benevolence towards one's spouse; it is more than the Christian charity
we may bear toward many: instead, it is a special sort of love which is
required only of the married. 26 For one thing, as Erasmus had indicated, it
is sensual, as well as spiritual. Rogers tells us that "by conjugalllove," he
means "not only Christian love, a grace of God's spirit: (for marriage
borders much what upon nature and flesh) nor yet a camall and sudden
flash of affection, completely enflamed by concupiscense: (rather brutish
than humane) but a sweet compounde of both, religion and nature."
which is "properly called Marriage love: m

Marriage was instituted to provide mutual support and comfort;
sensuous delight in the body of one's spouse is an essential element of the
comfort which marriage must provide: thus to take (and encourage)
delight is a duty which falls equally on both spouses: "Husband and
wife," writes Baxter, "must take delight in Love, and company, and converse of
each other." Gataker tells us that one of a husband's duties of "love" toward
his wife is "Joy & delight in her."28 He continues with a passage from
Proverbs, often quoted by Puritan writers on marriage: "Drinke, saith the
wise man [of Proverbs], the water of thine own cisterne: ... and rejoyce in the
wife of thy youth: Let her be with thee as a loving Hind, and the pleasant Roe: Let
her brests or bosome content thee at all times: and delight continually, or as the
word there is, even doate on the Love of her" (Proverbs 5: 15, 18, 19).29
This sensuous love is not simply permitted, given the existence of a
higher, holier, 'spritual' relation between man and wife, nor is it allowed
only to forward the other purposes of marriage. It is required as a
constituent and intrinsic element of a good marriage. This sensual
affection and delight must continue unabated, with the full intensity of
youthful desire, throughout the whole of married life. "Keep up your
Conjugal Love in a constant heat and vigor," writes Baxter. 3o From the very
onset, your spouse must be the apple of your eye. As life goes on, you
must delight in your spouse as if he or she were your new and youthful
husband or bride: Gataker writes that you must not suffer your "love to
grow luke-warme:'31
Physical deformities may not weaken your enjoyment of your spouse.
If there are (objectively) more beautiful women or handsome men,
disadvantageous comparisons should not be made: the pleasure you take
in your spouse should be so great, there should be no place for any
defect. 32 Counseling the wife, Rogers says, "Poare upon your own
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husband, and his parts, let him be the vaile of your eies, as Abimelec told
Sara, and looke no further." Then counseling the husband, he says, let
your wife "bee your furthest object: thinke you no virtues in an y beyonde
hers: those that are but small, yet make them great by oft contemplation:
those that are greater, esteeme and value at their due rate." Gouge (1626:
208) writes that "an husband's affection to his wife must be answerable to
his opinion of her: hee ought therefore to delight in his wife intirely, that is, so
to delight in her, as wholly and only delighting in her . .. if a man have wife, not
very beautiful, or proper, but having some deformity in her body," he
should nonetheless "delight in her, as if she were the finest and every way
most compleat woman in the world."33
The whole character of the love required, then, is this: spouses should
find their mates to be the most special and delightful persons in their
lives, throughout their lives. The Puritans who uphold this view are far
from being hostile to romance; indeed, they make romance a duty of
married life.34
Marriage is by no means only a sensual relation for the Puritan
theorists of marriage; spouses must also be spiritually devoted to each
other. Baxter tells us that "A principal duty between husband and wife, is, with
special care, and skill, and diligence, to help each other in the knowledge, and
obedience of God, in order to their salvation."35 This, too, is an obligation
which falls upon both husband and wife: wives as well as husbands may
criticize their spouses; thoughts, feelings, and actions out of a concern for
their spiritual and moral well-being. Wives who are normally required to
be docile and submissive thus have a certain freedom to be openly critical
of their husbands-in the service (or apparent service) of God, of course.
Baxter urged husbands and wives to pray together "in private," as well
as with the larger family, which includes children and servants. Gouge
made conjugal prayer one of the duties of marriage. He tells us that the
need for "a true, spiritual, matrimonial love" between husband and wife
is one of the things "most meet to be mentioned in private prayer
betwixt" them; spouses should pray "that such needful gifts and graces as
are wanting in either of them may be wrought: and such vices and
infirmities as they are subject unto may be rendered."J6
Such prayer between husband and wife provided one private occasion
where wives could openly criticize their husbands. We need not simply
assume that they did so: Baxter tells us, with startling frankness, that his
late wife
... was very desirous that we should all have lived in a constancy of
Devotion, and a blameless Innocency: And in this respect she was
the meetest helper that I could have had in the world (the ever I was
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acquainted with): For I was apt to be over-careless in my Speech,
and too backward in my Duty; And [at her death] she was still
endavoring to bring me to greater wariness and strictness in both: If
I spake rashly or sharply, it offended her: If I carried it (as I was apt)
with too much neglect of Ceremony, or humble Complement to
any, she would modestly tell me of it: If my very Looks seemed not
pleasant, she would have me amend them (which my weak pained
state of Body undisposed me to do:) If I forgat any Week to
Catechize my Servants, and familiarly instruct them (besides my
ordinary Family-Duties) she was troubled at my remisness. And
whereas of late years my decay of Spirits, and deseased heaviness
and pain, made me much more seldom and cold in profitable
Conference and Discourse in my house, then I had been when I was
younger, and had more Ease, and Spirits, and natural Vigour, she
much blamed me, and was troubled at it, as a wrong to her self and
others: ... [though] of late years, my constant weakness and
pain ... [kept me much in] my bed, that I was seldomer in secret
Prayer with my Wife then she desired. 37
This freedom of wives to criticise their husbands creates a tension
within the Puritan conception of marriage: for the Puritans are firmly
convinced that men must rule and wives must obey. Gataker approvingly
quotes Colossians (3.18): "Wives, submit yourselves unto your Husbands, as
it is comely in the Lord."38 When thinking along these lines, the Puritans call
for restraint in feeling as well as submission in action. Women must
restrain their expressions of anger and discontent, even if their husbands'
conduct gives them good grounds. Docility and a loving gentleness
toward husbands are prime wifely virtues. This wifely restraint was to be
balanced, according to the theorists of marriage, by husbands' gentle and
restrained use of their own authority.39
Life is not all authority and submission; the Puritans knew that they
lived in a material world of food and drink, bedstead and fireplace. Thus
they said that husband and wife must also care for each other's material
and worldly comfort. Men who do not care for the physical well-being of
their wifes are severely condemned; prudence in managing household
affairs is one of the chief virtues of a wife. 40 Gataker tell us that
It is no shame or staine ... for a woman to be housewifely, be she
never so well borne, be she never so wealthy. For it is the womans
trade so to be: it is the end of her creation; it is that she was made for.
She was made for man, and given to man, not to be a playfellow, or a
bed-fellow, or a table-mate, onely with him, (and yet to be all these
too,) but to be a yoake-fellow, a worke-fellow, a fellow labourer with
him, to be an assistant and an helper unto him, in the managing of
such domesticall and household affaires. 41
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Thus the prospect that a woman is prudent ought to weigh heavily when
a man is choosing a mate. The wives of not a few eminent ministers in
both Old and New England handled all the financial affairs of the family,
leaving their husbands with greater liberty to concern themselves with
matters spiritual and ecclesiastical; the men praised their women for this
in no uncertain terms.42
Some writers put this obligation to care for the ethical, religious, and
worldly well-being of one's spouse in the words that will remind you of
Aristotle and Thomas: they say that husband and wife must be the best of
friends; you may have no greater friend than your spouse. It may be asked,
says Taylor, "whether a friend may be more than Husband or Wife" to
you? To which he answers,
... it can neither be reasonable or just, prudent or lawful: but the
reason is, because marriage is the Queen of friendships, in which
there is a communication of all that can be communicated by
friendship ... other friendships are a part of this [marriage friendship], they are marriages too, less indeed then the other, because
they cannot, must not, be all the indearment which they other is; yet
that being the principal, is the measure of the rest, and all to be
honoured by like dignities, and measured by the same rules, ...
friendships are Marriages of the soul, and of fortunes and interests,
and counsels ... [as] they are brotherhoods too ... 13
The Puritans were familiar with Cicero's De Amicitia as wen as
Aristotle's Ethics, but they are closer to Aristotle than they are to Cicero,
for the Roman thinks that friendship can occur only among men. Cicero
finds much of the meaning of friendship in politics and war, although he
thinks it can be enjoyed by those who have honorably retired from these
worlds. By their own example, friends must encourage each other to act
honorably in these harsh realms: we can love virtuous men "whom we
have never seen," says Cicero (De Amicitia 8. 28-29); "now," he
continues, "if the force of integrity is so great that we love it ... in those
we have never seen, ... what wonder that men's souls are stirred when
they think they see clearly the virtue and goodness of those with whom a
close intimacy is possible?" Cicero offers Gaius Luscinus Fabricius, the
Roman general and consul of the early third century B.C., nota ble, to later
Romans, as a model of the integrity and simplicity which marked the
mores of earlier days, as an example of a man whom he and his
contemporaries have never seen, but love. As the tale is told, Fabricius
resisted attempts to bribe him; thus, in spite of his high offices, he died
poor; provision had to be made for his daughter out of funds of the state.
Women such as Fabricius' daughter could suffer or enjoy a fate created
by the virtue of fathers and husbands in politics and war, but they were
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not, for Cicero, ordinarily active participants in these realms. They were
not the stuff out of which friends could be made. Cicero held to the notion
that women were by nature weak and light-minded (infirmitas sexus and
levitas animi), although his experience of his first wife, Terentia, should
have made him doubt this belief. In his own time, some aristocratic
women did take an active part in Roman political life, but none of them
were models of political virtue for Cicero; he retained his admiration for
the manners and morals of the early Romans, who, with some exceptions,
reserved the worlds of politics and war to men.
Eros, too, prevents wives and husbands from being true friends.
Although friendship meant devotion, for Cicero, and a delight in being
together, it is not an erotic relation, nor one in which eros is welcome. He
disapproves of the homosexual friendships of Greek culture to which
some Romans of his own time were drawn. Homosexual intercourse is
unnatural, says Cicero (Tusculan Disputations). The poet Ennius writes
that "shame's beginning is the stripping of men's bodies openly"; Cicero
agrees: the shameful practice of homosexual friendship had its origin, he
thinks, "in the Greek gymnasia" (Tusculans 4. 70).
In general, he suspects sexuality, including the love of a man for a
woman, "to which nature has granted wider tolerance" than it has to male
homosexuality (Tusculans 4. 71). In sexual pleasure and sexual longing,
we lose the temperate, peaceful, and equable mood which the wise man
seeks to have at all times (Tusculans 4. 30ff). He condemns Aristotle and
the Peripatetics, who say that there is a proper place in our life for the
agitated movement of our soul if they are not excessive. This view, he
says, "must be regarded as weak and effeminate," mol/is et enervata.
"Those who are transported with delight at the enjoyment of sexual
pleasures are degraded," he writes; "those who covet them with feverish
soul are criminal. ... In fact, the whole passion ordinarily termed love
[amor] ... is of such exceeding triviality that I see nothing that I think
comparable with it" (Tusculans 4. 38-39, 68). It is worse than trivial, for it
leads us to do foolish and dishonorable things.
In their conception of marriage love, the Puritans reject Cicero's
attitude toward women, friendship, and sexuality. Husband and wife are
to be the best of friends; sensuality and sexuality are to be integral parts of
this friendship: friendship and erotic romance go hand in hand. The
unselfish devotion that men were to have for each other in the Ciceronian
tradition must give way, not to a new world of unqualified egoism toward
all, but to a kind of friendship with one's wife that was never called for by
the Roman senator.
In this notion of marriage love, many of the themes of classical and
medieval texts on friendship, including some of Cicero's, are retained or
given different form. The Puritans do not think that a major element of
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the friendship between husband and wife is the mutual encouragement
to honorable action in politics and war, yet they do conceive of marriage
friendship as one which should ethically and spiritually nourish husband
and wife, whatever their callings. Then again, while Cicero does not make
the usefulness of friends in practical matters the fundamental principle of
friendship, he does give it a place: your true friends will help you in
politics and business if they can. The Puritans, too, see husband and wife
as joined in practical affairs, though not matters of state; let the reader
recall Gataker's comment that woman was made to be a "yoake-fellow" as
well as a "play-fellow" to man, a "fellow labourer . .. in the managing
of ... domesticall and household affairs."
Some notions are lost. Cicero thought friends must nourish each other
in the realm of letters, manners, conversation, and thought, in short, in
the realm of urbane culture. 44 The Puritans did not think that marriage
had this purpose, nor, for that matter, did Cicero, which may be one more
reason why he did not think of marriage as a kind of friendship. There are
some starling new notions, as well, in the Puritan idea of marriage
friendship. The same Puritans who believed that husband and wife
should concern themselves with the ethical and spiritual character of
their spouse also believed that one of the greatest goods of life is being
loved by one's spouse. This love is a great good not because it leads our
husband or wife to lavish great gifts on us, or do whatever we say, but
because the love itself is comforting: someone cares for us, delights in us;
we are no longer alone in the world. In the works of Aristotle, Cicero, and
in the New Testament, this is a theme that is hardly to be found, if at all: it
is a great good to be loved by another human; above all, it is a great good for
a man, if he is loved by a woman, and a great good for a woman, if she is
loved by a man. This idea is a foundation of the Puritan theory of
marriage.
Much of this idea is found in Jeremy Taylor'S thought. Objecting to the
exalted belief that we should love a friend only for his virtue and not for
what we hope from him, Taylor (1662: 29-31) writes, "although I love my
friend because he is worthy, yet he is not worthy if he can do no good."
But what kind of good? True, "he is onely fit to be chosen for a friend who
can give me counsel, or defend my cause, or guide me right, or relieve me,
or can and will, when I need it, do me good: onely this I adde: into the
heapes of doing good, I will reckon" loving me, "for it is a pleasure to be
beloved." Marriage is the model of all other human friendships, for in no
other relation with a man or woman, can we be loved so welJ.45
In a full-scale attempt to see Puritan ideas of marriage as part of the
history of friendship, both in idea and practice, we should not ignore
Montaigne, who shares much with Cicero. As far as friendship goes, none

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol10/iss10/11

14

Leites: The Duty to Desire: Love, Friendship, and Sexuality in Some Purit
131

mE DUTY TO DESIRE

of "the four ancient forms of association-natural, social, hospitable,
erotic," writes Montaigne, "come up to real friendship, either separately,
or together." The love of women "is more active, more scorching, and
mere intense" than that of true friendship. "But it is an impetuous and
fickle flame, undulating and variable a fever flame, subject to fits and lulls,
that holds only by one corner. In friendship it is a general and universal
warmth, moderate and even, besides a constant and settled warmth, all
gentleness and smoothness, with nothing bitter and stinging about it."46
Montaigne thinks that the logics of desire in friendship and in our love
of women are quite different. Adopting the view so characteristic of the
Roman poet Martial, Montaigne thinks that a man's full possession of a
woman destroys his desire for her: "la jouyssance Ie perd"; we become
satiated, uninterested. 47 Friendship is different; the more it is enjoyed, the
more it is desired. The pleasure of a woman's friendship must thus
deprive a man of his desire for her: to the extent that he desires her, she
must not be his, but what is the pleasure of her friendship without his
secure knowledge of her love for him?
But what of marriage, which is supposed to be a stable relation? A man
cannot even hope that he and his wife will be friends, for friendship must
be freely given, but marriage "is a bargain to which only the entrance is
free-its continuance being constrained and forced, depending otherwise
than on our will-and a bargain ordinarily made for other ends."
Montaigne who devotes a remarkable essay to the memory of his friend,
They commonly lack the "capacity" (perhaps he means the powers of
spirit and mind) which sustain the "communion and fellowship" of
friendship; "nor does their soul seem firm enough to endure the strain of
so tight and durable a knot."48 Who can be surprised that the same
Montaigne who devotes aremarkable essay to the memory of his friend,
Etienne de la Boetie, makes but little and passing mention of his wife? The
distance between Montaigne and Puritans is great: I need only mention
the extraordinary records of conjugal devotion left by Richard Baxter
(1681), in his memoir of his wife, and by Lucy Hutchinson, in her memoir
of her husband, written for the sake of her children. 49
III

Benjamin Nelson, in his extraordinary essay on the history of friendship
in the West, says that the older ideal of an unselfish devotion of a man to
his friend gave way, in early modern Europe, to a new view, unsympathetic to this devotion. He believes this shift in attitude is part of a
larger passage in the West from the older world views of "tribal
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brotherhood" to the newer one of "universal otherhood" not universal
brotherhood. The older idea of friendship, in which devotion was but to
one or a few, did not become a basis for a new and triumphal view in
which devotion was to be given to every wider human groups; it was not
successfully universalised. Instead, the idea of friendship came under
attack and was ultimately replaced by an ethic which emphasised the
disciplined pursuit of one's own personal good. 50
The belief that a man should stand surety for a friend in need, even if
this means the risk of all his wealth, is often part of medieval and
Renaissance ideas of friendship. We find it dramatically and profoundly
developed in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice. Nelson describes sixteenthcentury attacks on this expression of unlimited devotion to one's friend,
the most striking of which is Luther's: "Standing surety is a work that is
too lofty for a man; it is unseemly, for it is presumptuous and an invasion
of God's rights. For ... the scriptures bid us to put our trust and place our
reliance on no man, but only on God; for human nature is false, vain,
deceitful, and unreliable. 51 In this matter, Luther finds an ally in Sir Walter
Raleigh, who tells his son,
... suffer not thyself to be wounded for other men's faults, and
scourged for other men's offences, which is the surety of another;
for thereby millions of men have been beggared and destroyed,
paying the reckoning of other men's riot, and the charge of other
men's folly and prodigality; if thou smart, smart for thine own sins;
and, above all things, be not made to carry the burdens of other
men: if any friend desire thee to be his surety, give him a part of
what thou hast to spare; if he press thee futher, he is not thy friend
at all ... 52
No doubt, Nelson is right to say that in early modern Europe, the belief
that friends ought to be devoted to one another without limit gave way, in
the realm of commerce, to the belief that we ought to be governed by
principles of rational business practice at all times, and make no
exceptions on grounds of love or affection. The harshness of the world of
commerce is not qualified by the idea that man should be a friend to man.
The claims of friendship do not disappear from the world, however;
indeed, in the sphere of marriage, they become more powerful than they
ever were. In economic life, tribal brotherhood gives way to univeral
otherhood, but in the realm of marriage, the belief in brotherhood and
friendship moves forward. It is sad that the aristocratic idea of friendship
among males could not become a norm governing all human relations,
among all human beings, in all spheres of life. It did not simply give way,
however, to another ethic in which friendship had no place; it would be
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better to say that the idea of friendship among males gave way to the love
between husband and wife. The claims of friendship remained circumscribed in their application, "triba!," but they made their home, and they
still make their home, in one of the most common relations of modern life.
The world of commerce lost some of the restraints that might have
mitigated its harshness, but the world of marriage gained an ethic, which
if heeded at all, makes it more humane.
In a later essay, Nelson takes account of some of these developments:
"too few seem to perceive that in the medieval world and in the early
modern world-prior, actually, to the Puritans-a full religious sacralization of the family or family property did not exist. There did, indeed, not
occur the sacralization of what might be called the special friendship with
one's own wife."53 He interprets the Puritan call for friendship with one's
spouse, however, in a curious way: it is "the sacralization of a collective
egoism of the family and its property." It is thus far from the ideal of male
friendship in antiquity and the middle ages, which Nelson says "was
conceived as the union that transcended all calculation and egotism
whether of family or of person. From at least the time of Plato forward, the
moralists and novelists insisted on preeminence of friendship, going so
far as to deny that one's wife or member of one's family could truly be
friends in the highest sense."
This is a prejudiced reading of friendship's twists and turns in history.
Puritan marriage love is no more a collective egoism than the friendship
among virtuous men espoused by Cicero. Cicero does call for a collective
egoism among friends, for friends ought to favor each other over others.
At the same time, this alliance has its limits: friends must not ask each
other to do what is shameful; as we know, they must be exemplars of
virtue to one another (De Amicitia 26, 35-40). The union of man and wife
in Puritan thought is no less ethical.

IV

In the foregoing, I have described features of some seventeenthcentury theories of marriage which bear significantly upon our understanding of contemporary American attitudes toward the union of man
and wife. If we look to Locke's Treatises of Government, however, we will
not find the complex of ideas just described. Locke, like Puritan and other
seventeenth-century writers on marriage, believed that an agreement to
marry had the character of a contract. 54 He was unlike them in thinking
that spouses themselves should, in principle, have a great deal of latitude
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in setting the terms of this contract. Their freedom is not unlimited, for
marriage does have natural purposes; spouses may not set terms which
would impede their achievement. Marriage's chief purpose is "the
continuation of the Species." This purpose, writes Locke, is not fulfilled
simply by "procreation," it requires that "young Ones" be nourished and
supported "till they are able to shift and provide for themselves."
"Inheritance," too, must be "taken care for."55 A man and a woman who
have taken on this purpose by marrying must therefore remain together
until all this is accomplished.
Locke also says that parental care and support is a "Right" of children;
once created, a child has a rightful claim to aid "from his Parents" (78,80).
"Inheritance," too, is a "Natural" right of children (91-93), so their rights
extend even beyond their youth; they have a claim against their parents
as adults. These rights of children also mean that husband and wife must
stay together. But for how long? When children can stand on their own
two feet, when, moreover, their inheritance is taken care of, Locke sees no
inherent reason why the marriage compact "may not be made determinable," that is, of limited duration, to end" either by consent, or at a certain
time, or upon certain Conditions." This would make it like other
"voluntary Compacts," which need not be made for life. There is no
necessity in the nature of marriage, "nor to the ends of it, that it should
always be for Life."56 Indeed, beyond the natural purposes of marriage
which bind the partners to certain terms, the ends of marriage should be
set by the partners themselves: the terms of a marriage contract should
answer the particular interests of those who wed.
Laslett notes that Locke was prepared to go even further than this. In
his Journal, Locke made notes for the rules of a society based on reason
alone, which he named "Atlantis." In this society, "he that is already
married may marry another woman with his left hand ... the ties,
duration of conditions of the left hand marriage shall be no other than
what is expressed in the contract of marriage between the parties."57
(Perhaps he thinks that since the business of procreation is taken care of
by the husband's first marriage, the parties to the second, "left hand"
marriage are free to design their marriage as they wish.)
The difference between Locke's attitude and that of the Puritans can be
readily seen if we compare the implicit theory of divorce and remarriage
in Locke's Second Treastise with the explicit theory in Milton's tracts on
divorce. From the point of view of pure reason, Locke thinks, mutual
willingness to part is, within limits, sufficient to justify a complete
divorce: a divorce which permits both parties to remarry. The reasons
why they wish to part are not relevant; their wish to do so is enough.
Parental obligations alone limit this freedom.
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No Puritan writer shared this attitude; all strictly limited the grounds of
divorce. 58 Most restricted these grounds to adultery and desertion; some
argued that these grounds do not even permit a complete divorce, but
only a separation; even the innocent party does not have the right to
remarry. Milton was far bolder. Like many of his Puritan colleagues, he
believes that the fundamental purpose of marriage is mutual support
and comfort. 59 He therefore concludes that if differences in temperament
between spouses make the fulfillment of this purpose impossible,
divorce ought to be permitted, offering the opportunity to remarriage to
both parties, although he leaves it up to the husband alone to decide
whether a divorce shall occur. To yoke together a man and a woman who
cannot give each other the warmth and comfort that marriage should give
condemns them to a miserable life; to force them to maintain such a union
defeats the purpose of marriage itself. Milton's argument that spouses
may divorce when they are tempermentally incompatible reveals an
attitude strikingly different from Locke's; for Milton argues his case in the
light of the specific purposes of marriage. Spouses are not at liberty to aim
at whatever ends they wish, but must guide themselves by the purposes
of marriage as they are revealed by scripture and natural reason.
Locke and the Puritan theorists of marriage differ in other ways as well.
Locke says that husbands should have the final say in marital disputes
over things held in common, for the final decision having to be made by
someone, "it naturally falls to the Man's share, as the abler and the
stronger."60 This subjection, however, is not basic to Locke's notion of
marriage. We would not be far from his own viewpoint if we argued that
husband and wife are equal and autonomous partners in marriage. In
arguing for this, however, we would be far from the attitude of the
Puritans, who make much of the submission of women to their husbands.
We may therefore favor Locke; to be fair, let us keep in mind his failure to
develop any conception of the emotional side of marriage as the Puritans
do.
Clearly, there are Lockean currents in modern American conceptions
of marriage: that husband and wife should meet each other as equals is
one; that the interests and inclinations of husband and wife should be
decisive in determining the character and objects of marriage is another.
But in other respects, we might do better to look to the Puritan writers to
find a source of some of our ideas of marriage. Four of their beliefs stand
out in this respect: (1) that a chief end, or the chief end, of marriage is
mutual support and comfort; (2) that sexual and sensual delight is
essential to that comfort; (3) that husband and wife must also be the best
of friends; (4) that this delight and friendship must last; neither may wane
with the years.
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In view of these ideas, how are we to evaluate Max Weber's belief that
the "decisive characteristic" of the Puritans was their "asceticism" which
"turned with all its force against one thing: the spontaneous enjoyment of
life and all it had to offer"?61 Much depends on a precise understanding of
what Weber thinks asceticism is: a systematic self-discipline in feeling,
intention, and action; which, if successful, means "the destruction of
spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment." In the creation of such a discipline,
writes Weber, lies "the great historical significance of Western
monasticism." It
... developed a systematic method of rational conduct with the
purpose of overcoming the status naturae, to free man from the
power of irritational impulses and his dependence on the world and
on nature. It attempted to subject man to the supremacy of a
purposeful will, to bring his actions under constant self-control with
a careful consideration of their ethical consequences ... this active
self-control ... was also the most important practical ideal of
Puritanism ... like every rational type of asceticism, [it] tried to
enable a man to maintain and act upon his constant motives,
especially those which it taught him itself, against the emotions. In
this formal psychological sense of the term, it tried to make him into
a personality. Contrary to many popular ideas, the end of this
asceticism was to be able to lead an alert, intelligent life: the most
urgent task the destruction of spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment.
The most important means [by which this asceticism achieved its
end] was by bringing order into the conduct of its adherents. 62
Weber is certainly correct in saying that the Puritan tried to make man
"a personality," that is, sought to make him a being who acts "upon his
constant motives" in all spheres of life, at all times. But the logic of selfcontrol in the Puritan psychology of daily life is varied; it does not always
involve hostility to spontaneous impulse in the name of psychic "order"
and "methodical contro!," as Weber thinks. 63 In the case of married life,
the Puritans called for an integration of ethics and impulse, constancy and
spontaneity. The life of duty is a life of discipline, yet they make the
spontaneous (and erotic) delight in one's spouse a duty of married life.
Mutual delight in one another is not simply desirable, it is required:
husband and wife together must make this a reality.64
Some might consider this odd, for how can one make such love a duty?
Can romantic love truly be governed with the same rigor as the more
emotionally neutral benevolence of eighteenth-century humanitarianism?
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In A Midsummer Night's Dream, Hermia loves Lysander, as he loves her;
Helena loves Demetrius, who loves not her, but Hermia. Yet once
touched with the juice of Oberon's magic herb, Lysander has eyes only
for Helena; a sign, he thinks, of his good judgment, for he says to his newfound love that "The will of man is by his reason sway'd;/ And reason says
you are the worthier maid" (Midsummer Night's Dream 2.2.115-116). With
further application of the juice of the same herb, Demetrius comes to love
Helena Oberon's Titania even comes to love Bottom, with his ass's head.
Titania tells Bottom she loves him, but Bottom replies, "Methinks,
mistress, you should have little reason for that. And yet, to say the truth,
reason and love have little company together now-a-days" (3. 1. 142144). The happy resolution of the romantic tangles of A Midsummer
Night's Dream are not solved by reason giving love its orders: we must
have eyes for one another to love, but his is no work of reason: Oberon
claims back Titania's love by another touch of her eyes. It is sweet magic,
not cool logic, that does the trick.
From the point of view of Kant, and many contemporary moral
philosophers, "ought" implies "can." Thus, love is beyond the rule of
morals if it is wholly, and naturally, outside of our control. If it is so, then a
fusion of ethics and eros in marriage love is beyond our control as well.
This is Weber's conviction; like many German intellectuals and artists of
the twentieth century, he thinks that rational self-discipline is no friend of
erotic spontaneity: they are in harmony only in exceptional circumstances. 65
"Rarely," writes Weber, does life grant us the fusion of the two "in pure
form." "He to whom it is given may speak of fate's fortune and grace-not
of his own merit."66
The Puritans understood that there was something beyond reason's
control in the love which must be found in marriage. It is mysterious,
mysterious, writes Rogers, as the
... league of friendship, wherein we see God doth so order it, that
by a secret instinct of love and sympathy, causing the heart of one to
incline to the other, two friends have beene as one spirit in two
bodies, as not only we see in Jonathan and David, but in heathens
which have striven to lay downe their lives for the safeguard of each
other ... oftimes a reason cannot be given by either partie, why
they should be so tender each to other: it being caused not by any
profitable or pleasurable means, but by mere sympathy, which is
farre the more and noble cement of union, than what else so ever.67
There is a similar mystery at the heart of marriage love. Its causes are
largely hidden and unknown; hence beyond our control: "the elme and
the vine doe naturally so entwine and embrace each other, that its called,
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the friendly elme; who can tell why? much more then in reasonable
creatures, it must be SO."68 Rogers even celebrates marriage love's distance
from the dictates of cool judgement: "through this instrument of
sympathie ... two consent together to become husband and wife,"
setting all others aside, although they are "more amiable in themselves,
more rich, better bred, and the like." It must not be our own doing, but
God's.
Others did not go this far, but agreed that love is rooted in temperamental
affinities which we cannot rule. 69 If we are wrongly joined, happiness is
beyond our reach. Yet an inability to love did not relieve a badly-yoked
husband and wife from their duty to love one another; for the Puritans
did not believe that "ought" implies "can" in matters of feeling, mood,
temperament, motivation, and character, they saw us as under obligations
we might not be able to fulfill without the aid of God's grace, which none
of us can command. 70 Puritan casuists therefore counselled their readers
to make a very c"lreful choice of partner. It is not necessary to be deeply in
love to marry, but a real likelihood that such love will develop is necessary.
No one ought to marry a person he thinks he cannot, or is not likely, to
love. This sense of one's affinity to a proposed spouse is of greater
importance than the wishes of one's own parents, weighty as that is.7!
Temperament is basic, but it is not all: Spouses can cultivate their
delight in each other. The Puritans saw this cultivation as daily
responsibility of spouses: "Put case," writes Rogers, that "thou hadst
grounds of first love to thy companion: what then? thinkst thou that this
edge will holde without dayly whetting?" To help couples keep the edge
on their marriage love, Puritan writers offer practical advice: Gouge, for
example, tells us that "outward mutual peace" is "one of the principall ...
means of maintaining an inward loving affection betwixt Man and Wife";
they should therefore "avoid offence"; if it is given, they should pass it by:
"Let them suffer their own will to be crossed, rather than discontent be
given to the other." If both be incensed together, "offer reconciliation"; if
it is offered, accept it. Do not bring "children, servants," or others "in the
family" into your frays. Do not compare your spouse to another. "Bee not
jealous. Endavour to please one another." Counseling husbands, Baxter
says, "Make not the infirmities" of your wives "to seem odious faults, but
excuse them as far as you lawfully may, by considering the frailty of the
Sex ... and considering also your own infirmities, and how much your
Wives must bear with yoU."72
Like the sharpening of a knife, however, the Puritan's advice on
cultivating marriage love tends to be superficial, inadequate to the task of
enabling us to be husbands and wives who are the deepest of lovers and
the best of friends. For the demands upon us are very high in this idea of
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marriage, even when we are married to someone to whom we are
temperamentally suited. Not many of us find it easy to achieve what the
Puritans say we must. There are many reasons for this; I shall note two
rather general ones: first, there is in many of us, a great deal of mistrust
and fear of those we love or want to love; often there is a great deal of
anger and defensiveness towards them as well. At least in part, these
attitudes have their source in our experience of our own family when we
were children; this past makes it difficult for us, as spouses, to nourish
and maintain the required love of our husbands or wives. In addition,
those we love, or seek to love, may have a similar mistrust or fear. They
thus may not find it easy to accept, indeed, may actively discourage, our
expressions of love and affection.
Such fears and defensiveness are not easily gotten at through the
means the Puritans advise us to use. Beyond this, their notion that wives
ought to forego expressions of anger hardly seems appropriate to a
marriage in which wives as well as husbands are to receive deep forms of
comfort and support from their partners. Anger is a natural occurrence
from time to time in any close relation; if we repeatedly ignore it believing
we ought to be docile, it does not thereby go away, at least not in ordinary
cases, but reveals itself in a variety of ways; for example, in a generally bad
temper, pervasive coldness, or loss of interest.
Moreover, the Puritans' emphasis on the unique friendship of marriage
poses problems. They call upon husband and wife to be the best of
friends, but they do not call upon each spouse to have close and intense
friendships with anyone else. This is unwise. Perhaps our spouse should
be our best friend, and the only one with whom we have sex, but it is
difficult to develop a friendship and sustain it, if all our (emotional) eggs
are in one basket. The Penalty we pay if our trust is misplaced is too great,
for we have no one to turn to if our best friend, our husband or wife, fails
us in some way: no one to turn to but the very source of our sorrow. It is
possible to nourish a friendship on this basis, but it seems to me difficult.
These difficulties can be removed. Husbands and wives can give up the
notion that men must rule and women submit. We can develop strong
friendships with others, so that there will be others to whom we can turn
in times of marriage trouble. But there are more general difficulties which
remain. We cannot easily heal the psychic wounds that disable us from
loving our spouses, or accepting their love, for these injuries lie deep.
They are found in parts of our psyche that do not commonly respond to
sage words of advice, nor are they removed by the peremptory demands
of conscience.
We might therefore conclude that the Puritan demands are impossibly
high, since very many of us cannot fulfill the duties of marriage they
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describe without a deep personal transformation that is surely not to be
accomplished by following the kind of advice they give to spouses who
don't come up to snuff. But the Puritan conceptions of marriage have not
died out; my own impression is that they are very much alive in the
United States. It is a commonplace of nineteenth- and twentieth-century
America that the family is supposed to be a haven in a heartless world, an
island of ease and sweetness in the midst of an unforgiving world of
commerce and industry, an oasis away from the "work ethic." For many
of us, perhaps, it has been the other way around: doing well in business is
easy compared to what is expected of us at home. Perhaps this is why
some of us work so hard: we can do so much better in career than we can
do at home, where the claims of intimacy, friendship, and true love loom
so large. Work is a haven from a home asking more than our hearts, or our
spouses' hearts, can give.
Perhaps Puritan notions of marriage also account for some of the
popularity of Fsychoanalysis and allied therapies in this country during
the last half-century, for in the American context, these therapies have
held out the promise of enabling men and women to meet the demands
of marriage (or similar non-legal relations) more successfully.73 It is
curious that American psychotherapy, so often seen as hostile to
"puritanism," in fact often serves this Puritan end. Indeed, for some,
therapy becomes the test of whether a marriage is to continue or not. 741£ a
marriage is in trouble, one or both spouses seek therapy; if, after due time,
they still cannot provide each other with the needed warmth and comfort,
then they think a divorce justified. For they believe that nothing more can
be done. The temperamental failings lie too deep to be cured.
In retrospect, it appears that the Puritan demands upon spouses were
not matched by the means which they gave to married couples to meet
these demands. A similar situation may be still true today. Nonetheless,
we might attribute at least some of the popularity of psychotherapies in
the United States to their ability (or presumed ability) to make us what we
should be as husbands and wives. In any case, if we want to look at the
sources of some of the present perplexities of marriage, we had better not
look only at Locke, but at Gouge, Gataker, Rogers, and their colleagues.
The Puritans were fanatic about many things, including marriage; at least
in this area, many of us continue a devotion to their demands, although
we are not so sure about how well we are able to meet them.
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Two texts stand out as insightful introductions to Puritan theories of marriage: Levin
Ludwig Schue king, Die Puritanische Familie; in literarsoziologischer Sicht (Berne and Munich:
Francke Verlag, 1964, eng. trans., 1969), and William Haller and Malleville Haller, "The
Puritan Art of Love," Huntington Library Quarterly 5 (1941-42) :235-272. For criticisms of the
claim of Schucking (and others) that Puritan views on marriage were novel, see Margo
Todd, "Humanists, Puritans and the Spiritualized Household," Church History 49
(1980): 18-34, and Kathleen M. Davies, "The Sacred Condition of Equality- How Original
Were Puritan Doctrines of Marriage?" Social History 2 (1977) :563-580.
1. Those who were Puritan in the ways described divided on the details of their ethics,
belief, rite, and piety, and on other matters as well. The legitimacy of clerical authority and,
more generally, of all hierarchies of wealth and power was a great point of contention. For
an interesting discussion of this issue at the end of the Interregnum, see Barry Reay, "The
Quakers, 1659, and The Restoration of the Monarchy," History 63 (1978):193-213. For a
discussion of the meaning of "Puritan" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Basil
Hall, "Puritanism: The Problem of Definition," in, Studies in Church History 2, ed. by G. J.
Cuming (London: Nelson, 1965), pp. 283-296. Much too can be learned from Vytautas
Kavolis, "Social Movements and Civilizational Processes," Comparative Civilizations Review
8 (1982):31-58.
2. Roman Catechism of 1566, pp. 2, 8, 13, 14, in, John Thomas Noonan, Contraception
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
3. In De Bono Conjugale (3.3), Augustine writes that the marriage of old people must
have some other purpose than procreation: it is the good of "mutual companionship
between the two sexes" (in diversu sexu societatem). This notion of companionship as a good
is omitted, however, in his general statements in this work concerning the good of marriage.
See Noonan, Contraceptioll, p. 128.
4. It lives, too, in Noonan, C""traception, an excellent and subtle work.
5. John Major (1519):4. 31, in Noonan, Contraception, p. 311.
6. Noonan, Contraceplion, p. 326.
7. Noonan, p. 276.
8. Erasmus of Rotterdam, A Right Frulefull Epystle ... ill Laude and Prayse of Matrymany, tr.
of EllcomillllllllatrimOllii by Richard Tavernour (London: R. Redman, 1530, 1st pub. in Latin,
1518).
9. Erasmus, A Righi Frlliefull Epystle, sigs. A5 V -[A71. Although first published in printed
form on March 30,1518, Telle says that "en fait la publication de I'Ellcamium Malrimanii ne
date pas de mars 1518," for in some form or other, 'Topuscule etait connu en manuscrit
de puis plus de' vingt ans et courait de mains en mains a travers to ute l'Europe." Emile Telle,
Erasnze de Rotterdam elle septienze sacremelll (Geneva: E. Droz, 1954), p. 155.
10. Erasmus, A Righi Frulefllll Epyslle, sig. A3 r . Even the English do, says Erasmus, in Telle,
Erasme, p. 165, but Tavernour does not include this wisecrack in his translation. Telle, in
Erasmc, p. 165 (n. 28) and pp. 179-180, thinks that this passage suggests that the Encomium "a
ete remanie en Angleterre au contact du groupe Colet, Latimer, Linacre, More. En cette fin
de XV" et debut de XVI" siecle, il appert que la question du mariage etait un des sujets les
plus debattus outre-Manche .... C'est dans ce pays OU la question du celibat, du mariage et
surtout des mauvais mariages parait avoir ete a l'ordre du jour." For the evidence which

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1985

25

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 10 [1985], No. 10, Art. 11
142

CIVILIZA TIONS EAST AND WEST

Telle offers for the English influence on Erasmus' views on marriage, see esp. Erasme, pp.
197-180.
11. "Humanists, Puritans and the Spiritualized Household," pp. 18, 21.
12. Todd, p. 32.
13. Teile, Erasme, p. 462.
14. Robert Bellarmine, An Ample Declaration of the Christian Doctrine, tr. by Richard
Hadock (Douai, 1604), pp. 257-58. Telle (p. 458) thinks that Erasmus works out his anticelibatarian views in terms of "Ie paulisme matrimonial," but provides plenty of evidence to
link them to a philosophy of what is natural and proper to humankind that is alive in
Aristotle, Thomas, the late medieval theologians I mention above, as well as the humanists,
Italian and Northern. Telle (p. 180) writes that Erasmus "n'a jamais ecrit ni pense cette
phrase par exemple [:) 'Quod naturae est, imputatur a malo'." Would this be any less true of
Thomas?
15. See note 10 above.
16. Todd, "Humanists, Puritans and the Spiritualized Household," p. 19.
17. Daniel Rogers, Matrimaniall Honour (London: Philip Nevil, 1642), p. 9.
18. William Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, 2nd ed. (London: John Beale, 1626), pp. 242,
123. Jeremy Taylor, The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living, 2nd ed. (London: Richard Royston,
1657), pp. 81-82, disagrees with the Puritans on this point. In his estimation of celibacy, he
is close to Bellarmine. He praises a chaste widowhood, but reserves his highest esteem for
the virginal life: It is" a life of Angels": "being un mingled with the world, it is aptto converse
with God: and by not feeling the warmth of a too forward and indulgent nature, flames out
with Holy fires, till it be burned like the Cherubin ... Natural virginity of itself is not a state
more acceptable to God: but that which is chosen and voluntary in order to the
conveniences of Religion and separation from worldly incumbrances, is therefore better
than the married life; ... it is a freedom from cares, an opportunity to spend more time in
spiritual imployment; ... it containeth in it a victory over lusts, and great desires of Religion
and self-denial, and therefore is more excellent than the married life." It allows as Taylor
says elsewhere, "a perfect mortification of our strongest appetites" (in Eniatos, 2nd ed., 2 vols.
[London: Richard Royston, 1655), p. 222).
Self-mortification is a well-developed theme in both the Puritan and Roman Catholic
worlds of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but the Puritans do not make much of
self-mortification through the denial of the sexuality which belongs to marriage love, a love
both spiritual and yet sensual, a love which leads couples to marry and sustains them once
married. For this reason, Max Weber's characterization of Puritanism as an "inner-worldly
asceticism" is misleading. The Puritans do call for mortification of sexual desire when illicit,
but they call for an integration of the sexuality of husband and wife with other elements of the
good and holy life. They therefore rejectthe admiration of sexual self-mortification found in
the Roman Church of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, in authors as
different as Ignatius of Loyola and Pascal. Weber is plainly wrong when he writes that "the
sexual asceticism of Puritanism differs only in degree, not in fundamental principle," from
that of Western medieval monasticism. (See Max Weber, Gesammeltc Aufsatze zur
Religionssoziologie, Vol. I [Tubingen: J. c. B. Mohr, 1920), pp. 169-170; English translation,
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, tr. by T. Parsons [New York: Scribner, 1958), p.
158.) In this matter, the case of Baxter is instructive. Unlike most of the Puritans who wrote
about marriage, and in spite of the spiritual support he received from his life, he thought the
single life generally more suitable to the main ends of the Christian life. These ends are
three: to "serve God," advance our "spiritual welfare," and increase our "Holinesse." Yet he
does not praise those who choose the chaste single life for their sexual renunciation, nor
does he list the sexual aspect of marriage as one of its spiritual disadvantages. In the main,
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his objection is that marriage creates so many worldly cares and concerns that it easily
impedes both the active and contemplative elements of the Christian life, a theme wellknown in the writings of the Roman Church, but linked in that tradition to an admiration of
sexual renunciation. See Baxter, A Christian Directory, II, pp. 3-12.
19. Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, I, p. 123. William Ames, Conscience with the Power and
Cases Thereof (London, 1639), p. 197. Daniel Rogers, Matrimoniall Honour (London: Philip
Nevil, 1642), p. 6. Secker writes, "One of the Popes of Rome, sprinkles this unholy drop"
upon marriage: "carnis polulionem & immunditem." "It's strange," says Secker, "that that
should be a pollution, which was instituted before corruption: or that impurity, which was
ordained in the state of innocency," in, William Secker, A Wedding Ring Fit for the Finger
(London: Thomas Parkhurst, 1658), p. 17.
20. Secker, A Wedding Wing, p. 15.
21. Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, I, p. 121.
22. Gouge, Of Domesticall Dulies, p. 131. Baxter, A Christian Directory, II, p. 40. Rogers,
Matrimoniall Honour, p. 146.
23. Thomas Gataker, A Mariage Praia (London: Fulke Clifton and James Bowler, 1624), p.
146.
24. Taylor, Eniatos, II, pp. 224--225.
25. Baxter, A Christian Directory, II, p. 41.
26. Thomas Gataker, Marriage Duties Briefly Couched Togither (London: William Bladen,
1620), p. 37.
27. Rogers, Matrimoniall Honour, p. 150.
28. Baxter, A Christian Directory, II, p. 42. Gataker, Marriage Duties, p. 44.
29. For a similar use of this passage, see Matthew Griffith, Bethel: or, a Forme for Families
(London: Ro. Allott and Hen. Taunton, 1634), pp. 280-281, 286, and Baxter, A Christian
Directory, II, p. 42.

30. Baxter, A Christian Directory, II, p. 43.
31. Gataker, Marriage Duties, p. 37. For similar remarks, see Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties,
pp. 239-241.
32. Gataker, Marriage Duties, p. 44; and Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, p. 134.
33. Rogers, Matrimoniall Honour, p. 157. Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, p. 208. For a like
passage, see Gataker, Marriage Duties, p. 44. Lucy, wife of a Puritan soldier, herself a Puritan,
and brought up in a Puritan household, begins her description of the physical appearance
of her late husband in the following way, in a memoir of him prepared for the benefit of their
children: "He was of middle stature, of a slender and exactly well-proportioned shape in all
parts, his com plexion fair, his hair of light brown, very thick set in his youth, softer than the
finest silk, and curling into loose great rings at the ends; his eyes of a lively grey, wellshaped and full of life and vigour, graced with many becoming motions; his visage thin, his
mouth well made, his lips very ruddy and graceful, although the nether chap shut over the
upper, yet it was in such a manner as was not unbecoming; his teeth were even and white as
the purest ivory, his chin was something long, and the mould of his face; his forehead was
not very high; his nose was raised and sharp; but withal he had a most amiable countenance,
which carried in it something of magnanimity and majesty mixed with sweetness, that at the
same time bespoke love and awe in all that saw him; his skin was smooth and white, his legs
and feet excellently well-made; he was quick in his pace and turns, nimble and active and
graceful in all his motions; he was apt for any bodily excercise, and any that he did became
him; he could dance admirably well, but neither in youth nor riper years made any practice
of it ... " She goes on to describe other admirable qualities, including those he possessed in
music, dress, and wit. A separate and major section of her memoir is devoted to his moral
and spiritual virtues.
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Her description of her husband, no doubt, owes much to modes of thought and
perception that do not have their origin, in Puritan culture. She is familiar with elements of
the culture of the court, which owed much to the aristocratic manners and arts of the
Continent. Her father was a gentleman who had spent time at court; she hersl'lf grew up in
the precincts of the Tower of London, "whereof her father" had been" made lieutenant." In,
Lucy Hutchinson, Memoirs of Colonel Hutchillson (London: Dent, 1965), p. 10.
She writes of herself as a child, "] thought it no sin to learn or hear witty songs and
amorous sonnets or poems, and twenty things of that kind, wherein] was so apt that]
became the confidant in all the loves that were managed among my mother's young
women" (p. 15). These sonnets or poems were not of Puritan origin, yet they were shared
and sung in a Puritan household; as a grown woman, she disapproves of them, yet her own
description shows that when she seeks to express her love of her hus/Jalld, she still favors that
amorous style learned in her youth.
The literature of knightly romance-Amadis of Gaul and the like-so popular in
Elizabethan and Stuart England, even among the pious, also taught the Puritans something
about the passion of love. To assuage the conscience of the pious reader, the stories were
often given a moral veneer. Such literature is less in evidence in seventeenth-century New
England, though it is by no means absent: see. Louis Booker Wright, Middle-Class Culture ill
Elizabethan Ellgland (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), and The Cultural
Life of the American Colmlies, 1607-1763 (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 141-144. For an
amusing use of the literary style of the romance in early eighteenth-century New England,
see the journal of Sarah Kemble Knight first published in 1825; for a twentieth-century
edition, see Sarah Kemble Knight, The Journal of Madam Knight, ed. by Malcolm Freiberg
(Boston: David R. Godine, 1972). A lively excerpt is published in Perry Miller and Thomas j.
johnson, eds. The Puritans (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), II, pp. 425-447.
The literature of romance, as developed in the more refined forms of English poetry, may
have also played a part in encouraging the flowering of romantic notions of marriage love
among the Puritans. john Leverett, later to be president of Harvard Colleg", while still a
student, copied out several stanzas from Cowley'S "Elegie upon Anacreon" and "The
Mistress." Elnathan Chauncy, Son of Harvard's President Charles Chauncy, copied out
lyrics of both Herrick, including most of "Gather ye rosebuds while ye may," and Spenser;
he gave twenty pages of his notebook to the latter poet; see Samuel Eliot Morison, The Puritall
Pranaos (New York: New York University Press, 1936), pp. 46-52. Milton was not the only
Puritan who read Spenser.
For the Spenserian background of Milton's thoughts on marriage love, see William
Haller, "Hail Wedded Love'." ELH 13 (1946):76-97. For a complex and sophisticated
discussion of ideas of marriage, love, and sexuality in Spenser and in Shakespeare, see
Walter B. C. Watkins, Shakespeare and Spenser (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950).
34. Puritan writers often turned to the Song of Songs to illustrate the love that a husband
must have for a wife, and a wife for a husband, as the Hailers have noted, in, William Haller
and Malleville Haller, "The Puritan Art of Love," p. 243. See, above all, Rogers, Matrimmliall
Honour, p. 313. Also, William Perkins, Christian OecmlOmis, Vol. III in Workes (London: john
Legatt et aI., 1616-1618), II, p. 691; Gouge; Griffith, p. 289; and john Milton, Tetrachordon,
1645, p. 335. For further documentation of the place of sexual love in marriage, as it is seen
by Puritans who affirm its place in no uncertain terms, see Roland Mushat Frye, "The
Teachings of Classical Puritanism on Conjugal Love," in, Studies ill the Renaissancc, 2, ed. by
M. A. Shaber (New York: The Renaissance Society of America, 1955).
Not all Puritans emphasize the sexual and sensual delight of marriage love. William
Perkins does not make much of it. True, he says that "the Communion of man and wife" is a
duty which "consisteth principally in the performance of speciall benevolence to one
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another, and that not of courtesie, but of due debt." Spouses must show "a singular and
entire affection towards one another." among other ways, "by an holy kind of rejoycing and
solacing themselves with each other, in a mutual declaration of the signes and tokens of love
and kindness." To support his position, he quotes, in addition to Proverbs 5: 18,19, Song of
Songs 1. 1: "Lei him kiss mel' with the kisses of his mouth, for thy love is better than wine." On the
other hand, Perkins does not say anything of this joyous, and sensuous intimacy in his
discussion of the ends of marriage, though he does say that mutual comfort is one of them,
in, Perkins, Christiml OecO/1Omie, III, pp. 689, 691, 671.
Baxter, too, fails to make much of the sensual and sexual side of marriage. He does tell
husband and wife that they must take delight in each other; he adds the comment that men
are perverse enough to turn "the lawful delight allowed them by God ... into loathing and
disdain." This, they must not do: Proverbs 5: 18-19 must be their guide, in, Baxter,A Christian
Directory, II, p. 42. Yet he does not make the mutual delights and comforts of marriage a chief
reason to marry. We must marry if we can serve God and ourselves better by doing so; we
must marry if our parents require it of us (and there is "no greater matter on the contrary to
hinder it"); we must marry if we are free to do so and "have not the gift of Continence." The
good of mutual support and comfort comes in by the back door, in answer to the question,
"May the aged marry that are frigid, Impotent, mId uflCapable of procreation? Answ. Yes, God hath
not forbidden them: And there are other lawful ends of marriage, as mutual help and
comfort &c. which may make it lawful" in, Baxter, II, pp. 3--4. It takes a question about the
aged to make him mention comfort as reason for marriage; he does not think that they are
that interested in sexual delight: he quotes Bacon, who says that wives are "old mens
nurses" -a good enough reason for an elderly man to marry. Baxter was less willing than
others to inh'grate the sexual with the affective, ethical and even spiritual elements of
marriage.
With respect to sexuality in marriage, Baxter is thus sometimes close to the anonymous
author of The Practice of Christiall Graces or The Whole Duty of Mall (1659), pp. 168-169 (quoted
in Schucking, Die PlIrit{/Ilische Families illiiterarsoziologischcr Sicht, p. 23), an enormously popular
guide to conduct in late seventeenth-century England, the England of the Restoration. This
author writes that in "lawful marriage ... men are not to think themselves let loose to please
their brutish appetites, but are to keep themselves within such rules of moderation, as agree
to the ends of Marriage, which [are] ... the begetting of children, and the avoiding of
fornication."
The character of Baxter's thought and feeling perhaps misled Weber in his judgment of
Puritanism, for the sociologist takes Baxter as an exemplar of Puritan attitudes toward
marriage sexuality. Perhaps this is why Weber thinks that modern dissociations of sexuality
from the deeper dimensions of emotional life are congenial to the Puritan sensibility. For
the fortunate, Weber thinks, there exists, beyond the realm of reason and cultural demands,
a life of desire, love, and passion, tragic in its irrationality, yet profoundly sustaining in its
meaning. He abhorred the "moderns" of his time who had no inkling of this darkly
luminous realm, who made sexuality a merely medical, physiological, or hygienic
phenomenon: a purely "rational" matter.
Writing of his own time, Weber remarks that "in a lecture, a zealous adherent of hygienic
prostitution--it was a question of the regulation of brothels and prostitutes-defended the
moral legitimacy of extra-marital intercourse (which was looked upon as hygienically
useful) by referring to its poetic justification in the case of Faust and Margare!." Weber
comments: "To treat Margaret as a prostitute and to fail to distinguish the powerful sway of
human passion from sexual intercourse for hygienic reasons, both are thoroughly
congenial to the Puritan standpoint," in Weber, Gesammelte Aufsatze, I, p. 170, n. 1; Protestant
Ethic, pp. 263-64). Weber, is mistaken; the Puritans understood and even sanctified the

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1985

29

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 10 [1985], No. 10, Art. 11
146

CIVILIZA nONS EAST AND WEST

passionate desire and erotic longing for another which endowed the Puritan marriage bed
with life-meanings far deeper than those captured by physiology. In marriage love, with its
sexuality, we find a true friend and companion, a second self: we are redeemed from our
loneliness. The Puritans would have condemned the love that joined Gretchen and Faust
together, but they call for a love, within marriage, no less deep and no less passionate.
The "hygienic" view which Weber abhors was perhaps the outlook of Bertrand Russell's
mother and father. In his autobiography (Bertrand Russell, Autobiography, 3 Vols. [Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1967-1969]' I, p. 10), Russell writes that his parents obtained
for his brother "a tutor of some scientific ability," who was, however, "in an advanced state
of consumption."" Apparently upon grounds of pure theory, my father and mother decided
that although he ought to remain childless on account of tuberculosis, it was unfair to expect
him to be celibate. My mother therefore allowed him to live with her, though I know of no
evidence that she derived any pleasure from doing so."
35. Baxter, A Christian Directory, II, p. 44.
36. Baxter, A Christian Directory, II, pp. 18-31. Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, pp. 138-139.
37. Richard Baxter, A Breviate of the Life of Margaret, the Daughter of Francis Charlton . .. and
Wife of Richard Baxter (London: B. Simmons and Brabazon Aylmer, 1681), pp. 70-71.
38. Gataker, Marriage Dllties, p. 1.
39. See, for example, Rogers, Matrimoniall Honour, pp. 211, 304-306. See Gataker, A
Marriage Praier, p. 20, in which Gataker quotes from I Peter 3.4: "A Meeke and quiet spirit, in a
woman especially, is a thing, saith Saint Peter, much set by in Gods sight." And also see Ames,
Conscience with the Power and the Cases Thereof, p. 156 and Rogers, Matrimoniall Honour, pp.
236--253.
40. See Rogers, Matrimoniall Honour, p. 220, who quotes Paul (I Timothy 5.8): "He that
provides not for his family hath forsaken the faith, and is worse than an Infidel!." For Rogers'
extended reproof of improvident husbands, whom he divides into nine sorts, see pp. 230236. For the wife, see Rogers, pp. 288-296.
41. Gataker, A Mariage Praier, pp. 18-19.
42. Baxter, inA Breviate, p. 67, writes that he "never knew" the "equal" of his wife's reason
in "prudential practical" matters: "in very hard cases, about what was to be done, she would
suddenly open all the way that was to be opened, in things of the Family, Estate, or any civil
business. And to confess the truth, experience acquainted her, that I knew less in such
things than she; and therefore was willing she should take it all upon her."
43. Jeremy Taylor, The Measures and Offices of Friendship, 3rd ed. (London: R. Royston,
1662), pp. 79-83. Ames, in Conscience (1639), tells us that a husband "ought to reckon of his
Wife in all things, as his neerest Companion, and as part of himselfe, or of the same whole, in
a certaine parity of honour."
44. In answer to a letter from Appius Claudius Pulcher, who has just returned to Rome,
Cicero (Ad Familiares 3. 9. 1) writes, "At last, after all, I have read a letter worthy of Appius
Claudius-a letter full of kindly feeling, courtesy, and consideration [plc/1as humanitatis,
offici, diligentiae). Evidently the very sight of your urban surroundings has given you back
your pristine urbanity." Brunt (" 'Amicitia' in the Late Roman Republic," Proceedings of the
Cambridge Philological Society 191, ii (1965) :1-20) writes that "sermo" [conversation],
"litterae" [letters, in the broad sense), and "huma/litas" were recognised in Cicero's Rome
"as qualities which might make even a disreputable man a welcome associate on whom the
name of friend could be bestowed."
45. Taylor, The Measures and Offices of Friendship, pp. 29-31.
46. Michel de Montaigne, Complete Essays, tr. by Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1958), pp. 136--137 (from Essais, I, 28 [De l'amitiell.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol10/iss10/11

30

Leites: The Duty to Desire: Love, Friendship, and Sexuality in Some Purit
THE DUTY TO DESIRE

147

47. Thus, for Martial, the difficulty of gaining a woman makes her attractive; there must
be some difficulty, else no desire can arise:
Moechus es Aufidiae, qui vir, Scaevine, fruisti;
rivalis fuerat qui tuus, ille vir est.
cur aliena placet libi, quae tua non placet, uxor?
numquid securus non potes arrigere? (Epigrams 3. 70)
In Kef's translation (Martial, Epigrams, tr. by W. C. A. Ker, 2 Vols. [London: William
Heinemann, 1919)):
You are the paramour of Aufidia, and you were Scaevinus, her husband; he who was
your rival is her husband. Why does another man's wife please you when she as your own
does not please you? Is it that when secure you lack appetite?
For further examples of the same strain of thought in the Epigrams, see 1. 57 and 1. 73.
48. Montaigne, Complete Essays, p. 138 (Essais, I, 28).
49. For a recent edition, written after her husband's death in 1664, but not published
until 1806, see Lucy Hutchinson, Memoirs of Colonel Hutchinson, 1965.
50. Benjamin Nelson, The Idea of Usury, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1969), pp. 139-164.
51. Martin Luther, Von Kaufshandlung und Wucher, 1524, quoted in Nelson, p. 152.
52. Walter Raleigh, Works, 2 Vols (London, 1751), II, pp. 351-352; quoted in Nelson, pp.
147-148.
53. Benjamin Nelson, "Eros, Logos, Nomos, Polis: Their Changing Balances and The
Vicissitudes of Communities and Civilizations," in, Changing Perspectives in the SCIentific
Study of Religimz, ed. by Alan W. Eister (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1974), pp. 85-111.
54. A careful reading of Locke's statements on marriage is found in Mary Lyndon
Shanley, "Marriage Contract and Social Contract in Seventeenth Century Political
Thought," Western Political Quarterly 32 (1979):79-91. For one Puritan discussion of
marriage as a contracts, see Rogers, Matrimonial! Honour, pp. 96-126.
55. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. by Peter Laslett (New York: New
American Library, 1963), II, 79, 82. I quote from Peter Laslett's edition of the Treatises which
is based on the third printing (1968), as corrected by Locke. "I" and "II" indicate the First and
Second Treatise, respectively. I refer to the sections of the Treatises, rather than to pages of
Laslett's edition, for the convenience of readers who use other editions.
56. Locke, Treatises, II, 81. Locke's view is a version of an argument rejected by the young
Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on the sentences of Peter Lombard (Scriptum in IV
Libras Sententiarum 4. 33. 2.1). "The union of man and woman in marriage is chiefly directed
to the begetting, rearing, and instruction of offspring. But all things are complete by a certain
time. Therefore after that time it is lawful to put away a wife without prejudice to the natural
law." Thomas replies, "By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the rearing of
offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its whole life. Hence it is of natural law that
parents should lay up for their children, and that children should be their parents' heirs."
Because sustaining the welfare of children is not a limited task of marriage, but a permanent
one, husband and wife "must live together for ever inseparably." Different notions of the
obligations of parents to their grown children divide Thomas and Locke. For Thomas, the
solidarity of the family unit remains crucial to the welfare of grown children; therefore, the
marriage of their parents is not to be dissolved. The same point can be sustained by an
examination of some of Thomas' arguments for the indissolubility of marriage in the Summa
Contra Gentiles (3. 123). The strain of individualism in Locke's thought surfaces in his
unwillingness to have parents bound by obligations to their children throughout their
whole lives: just as children must become free of parents, so parents must become free of
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children. The realities of English life, in Locke's time, however, often made grown children
of the better classes very much dependent upon their parents' good will.
57. John Locke, Joumal, 1679, Locke MSS (Oxford: Bodleian), quoted in Locke, Treatises,
p. 364, note to 81.
58. James Turner Johnson, A Society Ordered by God; EI1Xlish Puritan Marriaxe Doctrines in
the First Half of the Seventeenth Century (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970).
59. John Milton, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, 2nd ed. (London, 1664).
Tetrachordon, 1645). Colasterion (London, 1645). See Milton's edition of Bucer's work on
divorce, in, Martin Bucer, The Judgement of Martin Bucer, Concerning Divorce, tr. by John Milton
(London: Matthew Simmons, 1644). Also see Haller and Haller, "The Puritan Art of Love,"
and Haller, " 'Hail Wedded Love'."
60. Locke, Treatises, II, 82.
61. Weber, The Protestant Ethic, pp. 166-167 (Gesammelte, I, p. 183).
62. Weber, Gesammeite, I, p. 116; English translation which I have slightly modified, pp.
118-119.
63. Weber, Gesammelte, I, p. 118; English translation, p. 119.
64. On "integration" as a formative principle of the Puritan personality, see Zevedei
Barbu, Problems of Historical Psychology (New York: Grove Press, 1960).
65. The conviction that we must choose between erotic self-expression and rational
discipline is well expressed in Die Strasse (1923), Die Freudlose Gasse (1925), "street films" of
the 1920s, as well as in Der Blaue Engel (1930). After the Second World War, that same theme
runs through Das Madchen Rosemarie (1958). On the movies of the 1920s and 30s, especially
the street movies, see Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1947).
66. Weber, Gesammelte, I, p. 563; English translation in From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology, tr. and ed. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1946), p. 350.
67. Rogers, Matrimoniall Honour, pp. 147-148.
68. Thomas Gataker, A Good Wife Gods Gift (London: Fulke Clifton, 1623).
69. Baxter, A Christian Directory, II, p. 12 writes, "Next to the fear of God make choice of a
nature, or temperament that is not too much unsuitable to you. A crossness of Dispositions will be
a continued vexation: and you will have a Domestick War instead of Love." Yet he would
not praise, as Rogers does, the mysterious source of the love of a man and a woman which
leads them to wed: "Take special care, that fansie and passion over-rule not ReaStnl, and Friends
advice in the choice . .. of the person [you marry]. I know you must have Love to those you
match with: But that Love must be Rational, and such as you can justifie in the severest trial,
by the evidences of worth and fitness in the person whom you love. To say you Love, but you
know not why, is more beseeming Children or mad folks, than those that are soberly entering
upon a change of so great importance to them" (II, 10).
70. I am indebted to conversations with Robert Merrihew Adams for the perception of
this central element of Puritan moral theology. It should not be supposed that the Puritans
held this view just in order to make us acutely aware of the unavoidable impurity and
sinfulness of our hearts and wills, in the hope of bringing us to a real sense of our need for
salvation through God's grace and Christ's redemptive act. On the contrary, it would make
more sense to say that it was because of their belief that "ought" need not imply "can" that
many Puritans had such an acute sense of sin.
71. The Puritan casuists, Milton excepted, thought that although temperamental affinity
was of prime importance in the choice of a partner, a man had no right to divorce because he
made a bad choice; see Gataker, Marriage Duties, p. 35. Milton went a daring step further.
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72. Rogers, Malrimoniall Honour, p. 156. Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, pp. 133-134. Baxter,
A Christiall Directory, II, p. 41. Puritans sometimes say that if you are unfortunate enough to
choose a mate that does not suit your temperament, you must strive to achieve what is
beyond human power: you must bring yourself to love, by dint of effort and reason, a
spouse that does not suit you. Gataker, in, A Good Wife Gods Gifl (London: Fulker Clifton,
1623), p. 11 and Marriage Dulies, p. 35, speaking of the choice of a mate, says that "there are
secret links of affection, that no reason can be rendered of: as there are inbred dislikes, that
neither can be resolved, nor reconciled." "As there is no affection more forcible: than love,
"so there is none freer from force and compulsion." He quotes Cassiodorus: "Amor non
cogilur." Yet he tells those who have married one they cannot love "to strive even to enforce
their affections; and crave grace at Gods hand, where by they may be enabled to bring
themselves to that disposition, that God now requireth."
73. For solid eVidence of this see Nathan G. Hale, Jr., "From Berggasse XIX to Central
Park West: The Americanization of Psychoanalysis, 1919-1940," Journal of the History of the
Behavioral Sciences 14 (1978):299-315.
74. This was pointed out to me by my father, Nathan Leites, in a conversation which took
place in a Moroccan restaurant on (I believe) the Boulevard 5t. Germain in 1977.
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